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Insurance Companies' Liability for the
Acts of Agents
Kenneth Montlack*
T HE FORMERLY PREVALENT VIEW that a party to an insurance
contract is bound by his representations in all respects has
been modified.1 Today, an increasing variety of acts or declara-
tions by the insurance agent will shift the liability to the in-
surance company. The company is held to be estopped 2 from
pleading the insured's contract violations which were due to the
actions of the insurer's agents. Because the general rules of
agency apply to insurance agents,3 the company is responsible
for those acts of a licensed agent performed within the scope of
his authority.4 Thus the two problem areas in determining the
extent of the principal's (i.e., insurer's) liability are the identity
of the agent and the scope of authority, real or apparent, for dif-
ferent agents.
Who Are Agents
The agency question arises most frequently when anyone
attempts to bring together the insurance company and the in-
surance applicant. In that regard, one who solicits insurance or
collects a premium for a company (or aids in either capacity) is
considered an agent for the insurer.5 But the mere act of sub-
mitting an application for insurance, or collecting stipulated
commissions under contract from an insurance company,7 does
not of itself show an agency relation with the insurer. By the
* B.A., Univ. of Michigan; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Millard, Can a Beneficiary Collect on an Insurance Policy After the Agent
Places a False Answer in the Application?, 35 So. Calif. L. Rev. 506 (1962).
2 Ibid., 509-511.
3 Stovall, Authority of Insurance Agents to Bind the Company, 14 Baylor
L. Rev. 413 (1962).
4 Benoy, Ohio Insurance and Negligence Law, 147 (1937).
5 Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. of United States, 70 N. D. 122, 293
N. W. 200 (1940).
6 American Casualty Co. of Reading v. Ricas, 179 Md. 627, 22 A. 2d 484
(1941).
7 American Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Poole, 24 Tenn. App. 596, 148 S. W. 2d 14
(1941).
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same token, solicitation of insurance without the company's
knowledge or later ratification cannot bind the insurer.5
The insurance broker, usually a representative of the in-
sured,9 may also bind the company if his acts are directed to-
wards the insurer's purposes; 10 his status in such cases is a
question of fact which may be resolved by parol testimony out-
side of the written contract terms." Here the alleged "agent's"
past actions are significant indications of his present status vis-h-
vis insured and insurer. 12 Similarly, when a broker acts as
agent for both the insured and the insurer during negotiations
with the company, information known to the broker, and nor-
mally imputable by an agent to his principal, is considered as
knowledge of the company. 1"
The law's protective attitude towards the insured results,
in part, from the superior position of the insurance company over
the applicant. Thus, notice to the insured is an important factor
in establishing the insurer's defense. For this reason a designa-
tion in the policy including or excluding someone as agent for
the company is valid only from the time when the insured re-
ceives the policy.14 Although a solicitor may let one of several
companies issue a policy for a given applicant, the representative
is considered to be the agent for that insurer. 15 It should be re-
membered that these rules, while oversimplified when cited out
of context, are applied in complex factual situations, and further
complicated in that the "agent" is usually an agency dealing
with several insurance companies under contract.
Scope of Authority: The General Agent
The American agency system, through which the independ-
ent businessman invests his own money, pays his own ex-
penses, and hires his own employees, is largely responsible for
s Hartline v. Mut. Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n., 96 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 1938).
9 Freedman, Richards on Insurance, 1544-45 (5th ed., 1952).
10 Midwest Transfer Co. v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 342 Ill. App. 231, 96
N. E. 2d 228 (1951).
11 Freedman, op. cit. supra, n. 9.
12 Sioux City Inv. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 190 Iowa 1135, 181 N. W.
446 (1921).
13 Midwest Transfer Co. v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., supra n. 10.
14 Mutual Ben. Life. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 58 F, 723 (8th Cir. 1893).
15 Heinze v. Eve, 97 Ohio App. 451, 127 N. E. 2d 57 (1954).
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the success of the private insurance institution.16 Due to the
necessity of insurance in our economy and the key role played
by the agent or agency, the states have exercised regulatory
power in this area. The Ohio Code, typically, outlines standards
of ethics and competence for its licensed agents17 and provides
for enforcement of these rules by the Superintendent of In-
surance. 18
Ordinarily, this general agent or agency, acting as the
major avenue of communication between insurer and appli-
cant, has broad powers to deal with the insured. These powers
usually include the authority to accept risks on behalf of the
company, agree upon terms in the contract, and issue, renew or
modify terms in an existing contract. 19
As between the general agents of various types of in-
surance companies, different criteria are applied in determin-
ing scope of authority. The recording agent for life insurance
companies has the right to issue policies 20 and collect premiums
thereon,2 1 but may not waive the insurer's right to depend on an
executed policy. 22
A fire insurance general agent has been held to enjoy ex-
tensive authority. He may, by words or acts, waive policy con-
ditions and forfeitures, unless the insured has received notice
as to restrictions on the agent's contractual power.23 Absent
such notice, a countersigning agent retains the right to modify the
policy; therefore, under the majority rule his knowledge of facts
which constitute, 24 or will shortly constitute, 25 grounds for for-
feiture are imputed to the insurance company, resulting in a
waiver of those terms. 26 Some decisions continue to reflect the
16 Freedman, op. cit. supra, n. 9 at 1400.
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 3905.02.
18 Ibid. § 3905.04.
19 Holland v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 229 Ark. 496, 316 S. W. 2d 707 (1958).
20 Wyche v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 198 . W. 2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App.
1946).
21 Ibid.
22 Westbrook v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. of Texas, 374 S. W. 2d 248 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963).
23 Miller v. Monticello Ins. Co., 50 Tenn. App. 363, 361 S. W. 2d 496 (1961).
24 Wyatt v. State Farm F. and Cas. Co., 78 Wyo. 228, 322 P. 2d 137 (1958).
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view that allowing imputed knowledge of such facts as waiver
of the relevant policy terms encourages fraud by the agent and
insured.2 7 Again, the trend towards a liberal definition of agency
rules seems to indicate a protective attitude with respect to the
mass of laymen who must negotiate with trained insurance per-
sonnel-in an area which is increasingly recognized as a neces-
sity.
Given this broad area of agency authority, the courts have
maintained the basic contract defenses available to companies,
where no prejudice to the insured would result. The effects of
express provisions in a policy limiting the agent's authority, in
areas generally considered to be within his scope of authority,
are operative only after issuance of the policy.28 Likewise, good
faith negotiations between agent and insured will not constitute
a waiver as to the insurer's statute of limitations defense. 29
If the policy or application contains a stronger provision ex-
pressly barring the agent from waiving certain conditions, this
term will be upheld. 0 Agents acting for company purposes, but
clearly in excess of the normal authority, will not bind the in-
surer,3 ' but the company may not defend against waiver or
estoppel on the basis of undisclosed instructions to the agent,3 2
or normal office procedure,3 3 which are contrary to the agent's
acts.
Scope of Authority: Solicitor and Adjustor
The solicitor's duties are limited to policy negotiations with
the applicant,3 4 therefore, the insurer is responsible for a lesser
range of acts. In Thomas v. Fields,35 the Ohio Supreme Court
held that Ohio Revised Code Section 3929.27, reciting an agency
relation between the insurer and the solicitor who deals with
27 Chismore v. Anchor F. Ins. Co., 131 Ia. 180, 108 N. W. 230 (1906); Spald-
ing v. New Hampshire F. Ins. Co., 71 N. H. 441, 52 A. 858 (1902).
28 Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Madric, 183 A. 2d 182 (Del. 1962).
29 Continental Ins. Co. v. Fire Ass'n. of Phila., 152 F. 2d 239 (6th Cir. 1945).
30 Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 N. Y. 2d 486, 160 N. E. 2d 40
(1959).
31 Freedman, op. cit. supra, n. 9 at 1583.
32 Forward v. Continental Ins. Co., 142 N. Y. 382, 37 N. E. 615 (1894).
33 Warren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 358 (D. C. La. 1941).
34 Royal Ins. Co. v. Silberman, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N. S.) 511, 34 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 737 (Ohio App. 1904).
35 196 N. E. 2d 103 (Ohio, 1964).
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the application, does not continue throughout the duration of
the policy; nevertheless, the company was held liable for the
soliciting agency's fraudulent acts, which occurred after ap-
proval of the application and issuance of the policy. The court
reasoned that the issuer, by allowing the solicitor to occupy a
position from which it could deceive the insured, was thereby
estopped from denying its responsibilities as principal.
Within this extensive area of insurance company liability,
even the long-standing rule that the soliciting agent has no
power to waive terms in the policy has been challenged. 6 The
United States Court of Appeals, in Gettins v. United States Life
Insurance Co.,37 held that the question of the agent's waiver of
an application term (requiring a medical examination as a pre-
requisite to coverage under the policy) was a factual issue for
the jury to determine. This decision is significant because most
policies (drawn by the insurance company, of course) pre-
scribe that application items, as well as applicant's truthful
responses, are conditions to the insurer's obligations. An earlier
Ohio decision held that the solicitor's failure to complete an ap-
plication within a reasonable time before the insured's death
waived the policy requirement of a medical examination."8
Here also, notice of the solicitor's authority (or lack of it)
is a crucial issue. Insurer's liability will be decided on the
reasonableness of the applicant's assumption that the agent was
in fact authorized. 9 The company's responsibility in these situa-
tions is founded on the doctrine of apparent or ostensible au-
thority.40 In theory, such liability results from the principal's
actions in allowing the agent to act so as to lead the "ordinary,
reasonable" man to believe that the agent was within his scope of
authority.4 1
In reality, though, apparent authority seems to stand as a
catch-all source of liability where the court is faced with a
choice between placing the loss upon insured or insurer. Many
courts hold that even where an agent's declaration, contrary to
36 House v. Billnman, 340 Mich. 621, 66 N. W. 2d 213 (1954).
37 221 F. 2d 782 (6th Cir. 1955).
38 Peponis v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 370 Ohio L. Abs. 386, 47
N. E. 2d 251 (1942).
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a policy bar on his power to waive, does not constitute a waiver,
his acts may accomplish that result.42 Other courts now hold
the insurer liable for unauthorized acts of the agent on the
ground that as between two innocent parties (insured and in-
surer) a loss should be borne by the one who was the "oc-
casion" of the loss, even if that party was not at fault in any
respect.43 This comes close to a strict liability position vis-A-vis
the insurer.
However, the insurance companies may defend themselves
on forfeiture clauses where the application, premium note, or
the insured himself, acknowledges restrictions on the solicitor's
authority in a given matter.44 Even here it has been held that
the agent's misleading, incorrect or incomplete answer to an
applicant's question will estop the insurer from denying the
solicitor's authority as to the contract term affected.4
5
The solicitor's role usually ends with the procuring of the
policy. This point is important in judging which facts known to
the agent are imputed to the insurance company. In the ab-
sence of fraud or explicit restrictions on the agent's authority in
the application, all facts recited to a solicitor are imputed to the
insurance company,46 however, imputed knowledge of facts
which constitute grounds for forfeiture does not necessarily re-
sult in waiver of the applicable policy terms. Thus, when the
solicitor found the applicant to be in bad health, such information
was imputed to the insurer, but the agent himself remained pow-
erless to waive requirements of good health.47
The position of the fire insurance solicitor is clearly de-
fined. Dealing with insurance on tangible items such as coverage
of buildings, his authority extends to receipt of application, for-
warding of same to the company, delivery of policy to the in-
sured, and collection of premiums.4 8 He has no authority to
agree upon, change, or waive the terms of the policy; and his
knowledge in the area relating to the policy is not imputable to
42 Freedman, op. cit. supra, n. 9 at 1581.
43 Wilson v. Hicks, 40 Ohio St. 418 (1884).
44 Employers' Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 253 S. W. 2d 393 (Ky. 1952);
Haman v. Pyramid L. Ins. Co., 347 S. W. 2d 449 (Mo. App., 1961).
45 Owen v. American Home Assur. Co., 153 F. Supp. 928 (D. C. Cal. 1957).
40 Reserve L. Ins. Co. v. Bearden, 96 Ga. App. 549, 101 S. E. 2d 120 (1958).
47 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luzio, 123 Ohio St. 616, 176 N. E. 446
(1931).
48 Holland v. Interstate F. Ins. Co., supra n. 19.
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the insurer.49 As with all types of insurance activity, these gen-
eral rules will not protect a fire insurance company where,
through expansion of the solicitor's power to act, the insurer
increases his implied or apparent authority.50
The adjuster enters the picture at a later stage, following
the report of a claim, but, like the solicitor, his role is only inci-
dental to the operation of the policy. Normally the adjuster has
no authority (actual or apparent) to waive contract conditions
or forfeiture clauses.5 1 Where, however, the company allows this
agent to continually bypass policy provisions relating to con-
tract conditions, etc., it will be estopped from asserting such
clauses.52 Here ratification of originally unauthorized acts of
the adjuster will be inferred from the company's careless
failure to supervise the claims investigations. But, as in other
areas of insurance dealings with the public, the insurer can be
bound through the adjuster's bad faith investigation,53 or failure
to fully report crucial facts, 54 even though the principal's fault
is not alleged.
Torts of the Agent
There seems to be little difference between insurance com-
panies' liability for agents' torts and the responsibilities placed
on other businesses in constant communication with the public.
The plaintiff must show that the tortfeasor was agent to the in-
surer, and was acting within the scope of his authority during
commission of the tort.5 5 The majority of states holds that proof
of agency depends on evidence that the insurer had the right
to direct the agent's acts.50 In suits arising from automobile in-
juries caused by the agent, the issue of scope of authority is gen-
erally a factual question, resolved on the basis of the agreement
between insurer and agent as to agent's transportation,57 or in-
surer's reasonable expectations as to his mode of travel.58
49 Ibid.
50 Freedman, op. cit. supra, n. 9, at 158..
51 Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., 183 U. S. 308, 46 L. Ed.
213 (1902).
52 Ibid.
53 Royal Transit v. Central Surety and Ins. Corp., 168 F. 2d 345 (7th Cir.
1948).
54 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A. 2d 817 (1938).
55 36 A. L. R. 2d 269 (1954).
56 Ibid., 263-264 (1954).
57 Id., 270-278 (1954).
58 Id.
Sept., 1965
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
INSURANCE AGENTS
Of the intentional torts which the agent may commit, as-
sault, battery and slander are most likely to plague the com-
pany. The insurer escapes liability for the assault and battery
of its agent where the tortious act is related to the agent's per-
formance of his duties only by time and place.59 In effect, the
plaintiff must relate the injury-causing act to the very character
of the agent's authorized duties. In this sense the company is not
responsible for the tort, criminal in nature, which evidences that
the agent has abandoned his normal intent to further the in-
surance company's purposes. 0° Another element which often
proves important in determining the insurer's liability is the rea-
sonableness of the victim's reliance on the agent's authority to
do the tortious act.0 1
Actionable slander occurring within the agent's scope of au-
thority is charged to the insurer, under the majority rule.6 2
Some jurisdictions have restricted the insurer's liability, pre-
scribing that the tort must occur with the company's express
authorization or ratification. 3 These decisions have no special
import in terms of insurance business, alone, but would seem to
indicate the court's hesitancy to attach slander responsibility to
a principal.
Conclusion
The law's increasing willingness to extend protection to the
applicant or insured at the expense of the insurance company re-
sults from a growing appreciation of the necessity of insurance,
the technical nature of the insured's contractual obligations and
rights, and finally, the insurer's ability to bear (or redistribute)
the costs of increased liability. Assessing this trend, the writer
believes that workable and equitable answers to the problems
of insurance agency are being provided. Only through con-
tinued awareness of the individual's need for economic security,
can the courts achieve that balance between contractual rights
and public duties which is fundamental to any great business
institution.
59 22 A. L. R. 2d 1230 (1952).
60 Anderson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 128 Misc. 144, 218 N. Y. S. 494
(1926).
61 Tate, Insurance Company's Liability for Agent's Assault, 2 B. C. Ind. and
Com. L. R. 339-342 (1961).
62 55 A. L. R. 2d 831 (1957).
63 Ibid., 846 (1957).
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